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THE UNCERTAINTY OF CONDUCTING PRE-ACQUISITION
FCPA DUE DILIGENCE IN MERGERS AND ACQUISITIONS
INTRODUCTION
Given the extensive costs of pre-acquisition Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA) due diligence and the need to stay competitive in foreign markets, U.S. companies should not conduct expansive preacquisition FCPA due diligence while pursuing acquisitions of companies not subject to the FCPA. Congress enacted the FCPA in 1977 to
combat bribery and corruption of foreign officials by U.S. companies and
agents of those companies. 1 In recent years, the Department of Justice
(DOJ) and the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) have increased their investigations and the amount of enforcement actions taking place. 2 The FCPA affects Mergers and Acquisitions (M&A) by allowing the DOJ and SEC to impose successor liability for companies
who have acquired past violators of the FCPA 3 and for U.S. based companies who acquire a foreign company that regularly engages in corrupt
business decisions. This paper focuses on pre-acquisition FCPA due diligence in regards to acquisitions of target companies not subject to the
FCPA. Part I discusses the circumstances when FCPA due diligence may
not be possible, and I argue that companies find it impractical and inefficient. The current U.S. FCPA anti-corruption laws and FCPA Guidance,
make the process of conducting pre-acquisition FCPA due diligence inefficient with the uncertainty of prosecution by the DOJ and SEC. Part II
argues that FCPA due diligence prior to foreign acquisitions will not
result in smaller fine amounts and discusses when the DOJ will hold acquiring companies liable for successor liability. Part III analyzes the alternative methods to protect companies who forego pre-acquisition
FCPA due diligence, and I will argue that these measures will provide
the same level of protection without the extensive costs. Finally, in part
IV, I will discuss the ethical considerations of companies foregoing
FCPA due diligence and how that decision affects the lawyers’ ethical
obligations involved in the acquisition.

1.
2.

Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, 15 U.S.C.A. § 78dd-2.
See, e.g., Richard L., Cassin With Alstom, Three French Companies Are Now in the FCPA
Top
Ten,
THE
FCPA
BLOG
(Dec.
23,
2014,
9:45
AM),
http://www.fcpablog.com/blog/2014/12/23/with-alstom-three-french-companies-are-now-in-thefcpa-top-t.html.
3. For a discussion of the requirements of successor liability in the mergers and acquisition
context, see Carolyn Lindsey, More Than You Bargained For: Successor Liability under the U.S.
Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, 35 OHIO N.U. L. REV. 959, 965–68 (2009).

377

378

DENVER LAW REVIEW ONLINE

[Vol. 93

1. When Pre-acquisition FCPA Due Diligence is Impractical
While the importance of due diligence cannot be understated when
acquiring a company, in many circumstances, companies may not have
the time to conduct a thorough investigation, and the FCPA due diligence
costs can make the deal unattractive. 4 This issue was exemplified in a
takeover bid by Halliburton of Expro back in 2008, where, due to U.K.
laws, Halliburton was not allowed to conduct full due diligence. 5 Companies are then left at a competitive disadvantage with foreign businesses
that are not under the scope of the FCPA, and this may lead an American
corporation to forego a competitive bid for a foreign business.
The FCPA is largely based on voluntary self-disclosures, which
means a self-regulating industry of anti-corruption, 6 thus leaving companies at odds of self-disclosure or not. Companies who have discovered an
FCPA violation that has occurred in the past may find it more economical to eradicate the issues internally and forego self-disclosure to the
DOJ. In light of this, a company may find it better to conduct less FCPA
due diligence prior to a foreign acquisition. The DOJ and SEC have indicated they will consider self-disclosure in high regard to determine enforcement of potential violations. 7 An empirical study has shown no significance in relation to self-reporting and amount in fines and sanctions. 8
Given the conflicting statement and data, the issue of self-reporting has
become a decision between ethical obligations and business decisions.
These competing ideologies then become a cost-benefit analysis as to
what circumstances advance the company’s best interest. 9 With all of this
uncertainty, the DOJ and SEC will need to provide clearer guidance of
4. See, Adam Prestidge, Avoiding FCPA Surprises: Safe Harbor From Successor Liability in
Cross-Border Mergers and Acquisitions, 55 WM. & MARY L. REV. 305, 314–15 (2013).
5. See, e.g., Richard L. Cassin, Halliburton, Expro and Umbrellastream Star In Opinion
Procedure Release 08-02, THE FCPA BLOG (Jun. 25, 2008, 6:18 AM),
http://www.fcpablog.com/blog/2008/6/25/halliburton-expro-and-umbrellastream-star-in-opinionprocedu.html.
6. See Comm. On Int’l Bus. Transactions, The FCPA and It’s Impact on International Business Transactions – Should Anything Be Done to Minimize the Consequences of the U.S.’s Unique
Position on Combating Offshore Corruption?, 2011 N.Y.C. BAR ASS’N 7-8, available at
http://www2.nycbar.org/pdf/report/uploads/FCPAImpactonInternationalBusinessTransactions.pdf
[hereinafter N.Y.C. Bar Report].
7. See CRIMINAL DIV. OF THE U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE & ENFORCEMENT DIV. OF THE U.S.
SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, FCPA: A RESOURCE GUIDE TO THE U.S. FOREIGN CORRUPT PRACTICE ACT
54 (2012), available at
http://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/criminal-fraud/legacy/2015/01/16/guide.pdf
[hereinafter
FCPA GUIDANCE].
8. See Stephen J. Choi & Kevin E. Davis, Foreign Affairs and Enforcement of the Foreign
Corrupt Practices Act 17–22 (NYU Law & Economics, Research Paper No. 12-15, 2014), available
at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2116487 [hereinafter Foreign Affairs and Enforcement].
9. For an article that discusses the potential benefits and consequences from FCPA counsel,
see Laura Fraedrich & Jamie A. Schafer, What is in it For Me: How Recent Developments in FCPA
Enforcement Affect the Voluntary Disclosure Calculus, GLOBAL TRADE AND CUSTOMS JOURNAL,
Vol.8, Issue 9, (2013), available at
http://www.kirkland.com/siteFiles/Publications/Global%20Trade%20and%20Customs%20Journal%
20(Fraedrich%20byline)%20Sept.%202013.pdf.
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their enforcement actions, so U.S. companies will not need to compete
ethical obligations and business decisions.
The costs associated with FCPA due diligence may also accrue if
the investigation turns up some potential red flags that require further
post-closing investigation. While the SEC and DOJ released a joint guidance to give companies information to avoid or mitigate liability, the
enforcement actions are still at the discretion of the enforcement agencies
and the costs of compliance in the investigation have been in the multimillions of dollars.10 This leaves companies with a general idea of what
can be expected, but given the large amounts in fines handed down, as
mentioned above, acquisitions of companies with high-risk potential are
likely to slow down. In M&A transactions in which a target company
does business in high-risk potential countries, FCPA due diligence becomes more costly due to the available resources and the information
that may be accessible. 11 If a potential violation is found during that due
diligence process, it will then lead to either further costly investigations
with the DOJ and SEC being notified of the disclosure, 12 or the company
can choose not to disclose and risk discovery. The ethical obligations of
choosing not to disclose are discussed further below.
2. Pre-acquisition FCPA Due Diligence and Successor Liability
The level of pre-acquisition FCPA due diligence will have no correlative effect on the enforcement action of target companies not subject
to the FCPA pre-acquisition. Other more effective compliance and anticorruption policies incorporated post-acquisition will allow U.S. companies to stay competitive by keeping due diligence costs lower. 13 Since the
release of the FCPA Guidance issued by the DOJ and SEC, not every
foreign company that is acquired will subject a buying company to successor liability for past FCPA violations. 14 As the FCPA Guidance states
“successor liability does not, however, create liability where none existed
before”. 15
The DOJ further summarized its position in FCPA Opinion Release
14-02 that the past violations of an acquired company not within the jurisdiction of the FCPA will not be prosecuted against the acquiring company. 16 The DOJ will not prosecute past violations not subject to the
FCPA, but the DOJ was unwilling to give any advice or opinions as to

10. See FCPA GUIDANCE, supra note 7, at 28, 74–75.
11. See Prestidge, supra note 4, at 314–15.
12. Id.
13. See N.Y.C. Bar Report, supra note 6, at 9.
14. See FCPA GUIDANCE, supra note 7, at 28.
15. Id.
16. See U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Foreign Corrupt Practices Act Opinion Procedure Release 1402, (Nov. 7, 2014) http://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/criminal-fraud/legacy/2014/11/14/1402.pdf [hereinafter FCPA Opinion Release 14-02].
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the effects of post-acquisition violations during the integration process. 17
The example of pre-acquisition due diligence of the requestor in that
opinion saw no beneficial benefit from the extensive money spent in
conducting pre-acquisition due diligence. 18 This is an area of FCPA enforcement that the DOJ and SEC have yet to provide concrete guidance
for companies to avoid prosecution, leaving companies to proceed with
the uncertainty of discretionary prosecution by the two enforcement
agencies.
3. Foregoing Pre-acquisition FCPA Due Diligence
As a solution to the extensive costs of pre-acquisition FCPA due
diligence, U.S. companies should not conduct extensive pre-acquisition
FCPA due diligence when acquiring foreign companies not previously
subject to the FCPA. Companies should rather focus on post-acquisition
integration and structuring the transaction with deal devices for protection from liability.
A. FCPA Prosecution and Integration Measures
While many foreign countries have made initiatives to implement
anti-corruption laws, U.S. companies are still at a competitive disadvantage in foreign acquisitions of companies not subject to the FCPA or
stringent corruption laws. 19 Since successor liability will not be prosecuted under these facts, a U.S. company that foregoes an extensive and time
consuming pre-acquisition FCPA due diligence investigation will be able
to implement anti-corruption compliance measures to avoid future violations in the acquired company.
The DOJ has looked to nine factors when determining whether to
bring an enforcement action against a company, the biggest factor being
the nature and seriousness of the offense. 20 The company should shield
itself from successor liability with an effective corporate compliance
program that is implemented post-acquisition. The acquiring company
should implement the company procedures with the acquired company
starting from day one of the integration process to avoid any future violations. This solution will provide U.S. companies to compete better with
17. Id.
18. For an illustration of the amount of money the requestor spent for the FCPA due diligence
efforts to uncover past violations, see Prestidge, supra note 4.
19. See N.Y.C. Bar Report, supra note 6, at 8–14.
20. The 9 factors listed for consideration of prosecuting a corporation for FCPA violations:
“1. The nature and seriousness of the offense; 2. The pervasiveness of wrongdoing within the corporation; 3. The corporation’s history of similar misconduct; 4. The corporation’s timely and voluntary
disclosure of wrongdoing and willingness to cooperate; 5. The existence and effectiveness of the
corporation’s pre-existing compliance program; 6. The corporation’s remedial actions; 7. Collateral
consequences; 8. The adequacy of prosecution of individuals responsible for the corporation’s malfeasance; and 9. The adequacy of remedies such as civil or regulatory enforcement actions.” See
FCPA GUIDANCE, supra note 7, at 53. And for a study on the sanctions imposed under the FCPA,
see Foreign Affairs and Enforcement, supra note 8.
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foreign competitors who are not in the jurisdiction of the FCPA in foreign M&A transactions. The compliance programs initiated postacquisition will need to be extensive in high-risk areas of the acquired
company to avoid potential FCPA violations. 21 U.S. companies and those
in countries with similar anti-corruption laws will most likely be at a
competitive disadvantage, due to necessary increases in costs, compared
to their counterpart countries with no such laws. By foregoing preacquisition due diligence under the circumstances just enunciated, U.S.
companies engaged in foreign M&A transactions can help limit total
costs and potentially garner more business opportunities.
B. Structuring the Deal for Adequate Protection from Liability
Companies should, in turn, use other acquisition deal devices to circumvent the risks associated with FCPA violations that may come from
past practices of the acquired company. Per custom, acquiring companies
will hire consultants to help the integration process of doing business
abroad. 22 Hiring a consultant to handle the integration process of the acquired company and establishing FCPA compliance guidelines will help
ease the cost of an extensive pre-acquisition due diligence investigation.
With the correct consultant, a company can structure representations and
warranties that will provide assurance that the consultant acts in compliance with the FCPA and, as Kerschberg further states, a contractual indemnification provision can help ease potential FCPA violations. 23
A company should also protect the value of the deal with a comprehensive representations and warranties section specifically applicable to
the FCPA with the sellers of the foreign company. The starting point of
assessing the proper representations and warranties for the FCPA will be
considered based on the risk profile of the target company. 24 While negotiating representations and warranties, the extensive nature of these deal
devices will take into account the risk profile, where factors such as the
industry, geographic location, government contracts, and whether the
existing subsidiaries of the target company are in known high risk countries. These factors are likely to affect the amount of representations and
warranties needed. 25 In addition to these FCPA representations and war21. See N.Y.C. Bar Report, supra note 6, at 10.
22. See Ben Kerschberg, Protecting Your Corporation Against FCPA Liability in Mergers
and Acquisitions, FORBES (March 28, 2011, 9:50 AM),
http://www.forbes.com/sites/benkerschberg/2011/03/28/protecting-your-corporation-against-fcpaliability-in-mergers-acquisitions/ [hereinafter Protecting Your Corporation].
23. Id.
24. See, Gary DiBianco, “Anti-Corruption Due Diligence in Corporate Transactions: Implementing a Risk-Based Approach”, SKADDEN, ARPS, SLATE, MEAGHER & FLOM LLP (February
2013),
https://www.skadden.com/insights/anti-corruption-due-diligence-corporate-transactionsimplementing-risk-based-approach-anti25. For a more in depth analysis of risk factors affecting a company’s risk profile, supra note
20
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ranties, the acquiring company should negotiate for an indemnification
provision that covers any past contracts obtained through FCPA violations or ongoing FCPA violations.
4. Ethical Considerations of Non-disclosure of FCPA Violations
A more critical analysis involves the ethical responsibilities of a
lawyer involved with the company and his obligations to the bar. If the
non-disclosure of the potential FCPA violation would be considered an
ongoing fraud, the lawyer would have to disclose it under the rules of
professional conduct. 26 These rules would present issues for the lawyer,
and his knowledge may prevent the corporation from not disclosing the
violation or retaining the lawyer’s services. Given the large implications
involved, this may be an issue where the lawyer must recuse himself if
the non-disclosure rises to the level where it would be a breach of his
ethical duties. 27 Failure to conduct thorough FCPA due diligence involves in-house counsel to forego their duties to their client. 28
Lawyers will be forced to balance business decisions and their ethical duties to the client when deciding whether to forego pre-acquisition
FCPA due diligence. However, given the above considerations as to how
a company can protect itself from future FCPA violations when acquiring companies who were not previously subject to the FCPA can also
assure lawyers that their ethical obligations to the client are being satisfied. As one of the nine factors the DOJ looks to in deciding to prosecute 29 implementing an effective compliance and ethics program in the
company may help alleviate pre-acquisition costs while maintaining the
lawyers ethical obligations to his client.30
CONCLUSION
With growing trends in global anti-corruption laws and increased
enforcement trends under the FCPA, regulatory guidance will need to be
certain.
The growing costs of FCPA compliance and acquisition transaction
costs will affect the current due diligence landscape. While due diligence
as a whole is a process that should never be foregone, under the current
FCPA Guidance and successor liability, the representation and warranties combined with indemnification provisions will prove to be a competitive way to negotiate with foreign companies. This article only argues
26. See Colo. Rules of Prof’l Conduct 1.2, 1.6, 1.13 (2015).
27. Id.
28. Under the Colorado Rules of Professional Conduct, Rule 1.13, the duty is to the corporation and the decision to not undergo FCPA due diligence could come into question as misrepresentation of the client by the lawyer for putting the client at risk of potential legal liability. See Colo.
Rules of Prof’l Conduct 1.13, cmt. 3.
29. See note 20, supra.
30. See Colo. Rules of Prof’l Conduct 1.13 (2015).
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that there are circumstances when companies should provide less preacquisition FCPA due diligence and does not conclude that all due diligence of a target company should be foregone.

Richard Howieson

